ETWEEN 1 January 1959 and 31
October 1980, over 800,000 Cubans entered the United States. The overwhelming majority entered outside ordinary immigration channels and were afforded special status as de facto or officially recognized refugees. Virginia Dominguez has noted that it is impossible directly to correlate particular outflows of particular refugees leaving Cuba with specific. political and economic events occurring after Castro assumed power.' In general terms, however, it is possible to relate refugee-creating conditions in Cuba to U.S. policy directed toward the Castro regime, and to relate U.S. willingness to accept so many Cubans as refugees to the objectives of that policy.
Thus after a brief period of strained ( By 1980, moreover, the implicit rationale for regarding every Cuban migrant as a refugee had largely evaporated.
Responsible for that evaporation was not only the immediate sense that Mariel was a direct result of Castro's hostility toward the United States, but also a long-germinating realization that the Cubans who arrived here could no longer be used to make any further exemplary points about either the horrors of life under Castro or the more general failures of the communist system. That realization had its roots in a gradual redefinition of U.S.-Cuban relations that began while the freedom flights were still under way. The failure of this redefinition of 50. Typical of early coverage was a story describing asylum-seeking Cubans in their "voyage to freedom," "Sea Lift from Cuba to Key West," Newsweek, 5 May 1980, p. 59. Two weeks later, the press was emphasizing "the rapidly growing Among these developments were the evolution of more pragmatic and less ideological ways of managing the EastWest conflict; a new perception of Cuba as a nuisance rather than as an overt threat to hemispheric peace; a growing realization that the policy of economically and politically isolating Cuba was no longer a practical option, given the unwillingness of traditional allies to continue to cooperate; and a concomitant understanding that past policy had in any event failed, creating hardship in 62. In an op-ed piece commenting on the emerging Carter position, "The Rights Standard," LeFever argued that human rights policy should be subordinate to the national interest more broadly defined. He asserted it was in the national interest to continue supporting an "authoritarian ally," Chile, but not to improve relations with a "totalitarian adversary," Cuba, which maintained a military presence in Africa and held "thousands of political prisoners and denied many basic 
